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In 2008, South Africa witnessed a bout of xenophobic violence, requiring the state to declare a disaster to manage a massive displacement of migrants and 
foreigners. How did the South African state come to care for these populations, whereas it had previously sought to avoid providing protection to foreigners, 
and was seen as responsible for fostering xenophobia, if not violence? Analyzing the management of the disaster at the local level (in Cape Town), and the 
various discourses and mobilizations involved in it, this article shows how widespread violence and displacement rendered migrant vulnerabilities visible in 
the urban space and forced the state to temporarily recognize and protect those who became seen as “victims.” It also questions the idea that xenophobia 
and failure to comply with international norms were responsible for the lack of protection of migrants and foreigners. Rather, it is the kind of protection dis-
played, restricted to the “most vulnerable,” that failed to address the root causes of the violence and envision broader social integration issues. The article 
provides further theorization on what it means to treat violence as disaster and points out to the need to envisage critically humanitarian and social assist-
ance by including them in broader welfare patterns.
In May 2008, violent attacks against foreigners and 
strangers broke out in South African townships and infor-
mal settlements. Groups threatened, attacked, and killed 
those who appeared to be outsiders, and looted houses and 
properties. The violence started on the outskirts of Johan-
nesburg but rapidly spread to the rest of the country, and 
particularly the major cities. The following two weeks of 
what soon became known as xenophobic violence left 
sixty-two dead, hundreds wounded and between 80,000 
and 200,000 displaced.1 This probably constituted the 
worst episode of collective violence since the end of apart-
heid, and revealed a deep political crisis: the new democ-
racy and South african society were plagued by failures 
and fractures produced by persistant racial divisions and 
social inequalities, blatant xenophobia and political dead 
ends.
A first set of interpretations, rooted in contemporary 
studies of migration and the post-colonial critique of race 
and identities, argues that the making of the new South 
African democracy went hand in hand with the con-
struction of a national polity exclusive of migrants and 
foreigners, rooted in racism and exclusionary practices 
(Neocosmos 2008). The South African state is seen as 
responsible for the rise of this nationalism, as its discourse 
systematically favored the making of a political community 
based on national identity and legitimized practices of 
exclusion of foreign-born residents (Landau 2012). It was 
also criticized for its slow and limited reaction to this crisis 
and general reluctance to tackle xenophobia (Wa Kabwe-
Segatti 2008). Indeed, it took more than a week for the gov-
ernment to send the army to pacify the townships and 
prevent further deaths and violence. The governments of 
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1 Although the phrase “xenophobic violence” sug-
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fact one third of those killed were actually South 
African citizens from minority groups: Venda, Pedi, 
etc. (Misago et al. 2010).
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the Gauteng and Western Cape provinces waited between 
three and four weeks before officially declaring a provincial 
state of disaster that would allow them to provide assist-
ance to the displaced populations and set up shelters 
(“safety sites”).2 The crisis thus revealed a broader failure of 
the state to protect the populations residing on its territory 
and to comply with its own democratic institutions 
(Hayem 2013) – an analysis largely consistent with the rise 
of a violent democracy in contemporary South Africa 
(Holdt 2013).
Other authors argue that the turn to violence and the 
exclusion of foreigners are embedded in a wider set of frus-
trations, social inequalities, and political relations. Cooper 
(2009) situates acts of looting in aspirations to social inclu-
sion and “modern urban lifestyles” in a democracy that had 
failed its poor. Kerr and Durrheim (2013) suggest that 
xenophobic violence constitutes a response to broader 
economic transformations, the casualization of labour, and 
the increased competition created by the neo-liberal capi-
talist environment. Although these analyses fall short of 
explaining the specific conditions that lead to violence and 
why the exclusion of foreigners appears a legitimate answer 
(Landau 2012; Kirshner 2012), they do suggest the import-
ance of connecting xenophobia to neo-liberalism, social 
inequalities, and economic relations in the new democracy 
(Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013). James Ferguson (2013) 
provides further theoretical insights in this direction by 
suggesting how the rise of a neo-liberal capitalist system 
over the past decades has modified forms of social mem-
bership and welfare provision. Casualization of labor pro-
duces populations in surplus, which calls into question the 
inclusiveness of society, and threatens welfare and demo-
cratic rights. The more general question at stake here is on 
which basis welfare should be organized (national mem-
bership, democratic rights, vulnerabilities, etc.) and who 
should provide it (social networks, employers, or the state). 
This also relates to the question of state formation through 
inclusion and exclusion of groups of populations in Africa: 
Who gets to be included and allowed to benefit from a 
society and its state (Fourchard and Segatti 2015)?
In this article, I focus on the tensions and the links between 
exclusion, violence, and xenophobia as produced by the 
South African state, and broader forms of statecraft, wel-
fare, and political relations between the state and its popu-
lations. Rather than opposing these sets of interpretations, I 
follow Nancy Fraser’s justice theory (2011), to combine 
issues of recognition (through the question of xenophobia 
and the integration of migrants into South African com-
munities), and redistribution (here, forms of social pro-
tection practiced after the xenophobic violence). It is useful 
here to consider a puzzling shift: after the xenophobic viol-
ence, the state did somehow assist the migrants, whereas 
previously it had generally not done so (Palmary 2002). 
What can explain this shift? The tension between pro-
tection and exclusion of migrants is most explicit in the 
opening of camps that served as temporary shelters for the 
displaced: they embodied the incapacity of the state to pro-
tect migrants in the townships (Mosselson 2010), yet they 
also concealed victims in need of humanitarian assistance 
(Pillay 2013). In this sense, the crisis raised the question of 
the reach and the extent of the state: how much protection 
should it guarantee, to whom, and under which condition? 
More specifically, under which conditions can migrants in 
South Africa, who are usually invisible, denied rights, and 
facing xenophobia, come to be recognized and be “in care 
of the state” (de Swaan 1988)? I argue that such questions 
emerged with the situation of disaster (generated by the 
xenophobic violence), that rendered migrants’ vulnerabil-
ities visible in the urban space, allowed claims for justice, 
and forced the state to respond somehow and offer some 
protection, even if minimal, for a short period of time.
To explore these issues, disaster management at the local 
level provides a fruitful ground to analyze the possibilities 
and the limits of the state in its relationship to violence. 
Examining the political relations implied by the tools and 
2 Resorting to Disaster Management for a large-
scale population displacement after a riot may seem 
surprising at first glance: although this type of inter-
vention was common under apartheid, it was aban-
doned after the democratization. The article will 
elaborate on the reasons for this choice, but suffice 
to say for the moment that disaster management’s 
prime function is to coordinate responses to dis-
ruptions that exceed a community’s capacity to cope, 
whatever their causes may be (Republic of South 
Africa 2003).
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practices of disaster management used to manage the 
xenophobic violence enables alternative interpretations dis-
tinct from analyses of state failures to implement inter-
national norms of humanitarian protection (that 
themselves respond to a political project) or the moral 
implications of disaster and violence (Fassin 2010). It pro-
vides an opportunity to go beyond the sole “xenophobia” 
argument, since the exclusionary visions and practices of 
the Department of Home Affairs or the police (Wa Kabwe-
Segatti and Landau 2008) cannot automatically be 
extended to other departments. Although Disaster Man-
agement was not the only actor responsible for managing 
these events, it was the one tasked with dealing in the 
longer term with the internal contradictions of the state – 
how to care and protect those that the South African state 
and society are reluctant to accept? Disaster management is 
an organization whose role is to prevent and respond to 
disasters (Republic of South Africa 2003). It is composed of 
three levels, national, provincial, and municipal, charged 
with coordinating risks assessment and response to dis-
asters. Since the end of apartheid, its missions have largely 
been desecuritized and reorientated towards development 
and environmental disasters.
Disaster management in South Africa is firstly a responsi-
bility of local and regional government. Focusing on this 
level enables tracing the various interventions on the “dis-
aster” scene, and capturing the different layers of the state. 
National political discourses have to be disentangled from 
local and provincial governments’ responses to the crisis, as 
the latter are the first respondents and responsible for 
social integration and the care of displaced populations 
(Republic of South Africa 2003). Such perspective 
enlightens the inner workings of the state, and how policies 
and bureaucrats shape political relations with populations 
(Chipkin and Meny-Gibert 2012). As Dubbeld (2013) 
noted, focusing on protests and discourses of state failure 
may illuminate the limits and malfunctions of the state, but 
does not suffice to understand the stalemates of South 
African democratization.
The article draws on interviews, observations, and dis-
cussions conducted in 2008 in Cape Town, focusing on the 
instruments, discourses, and interventions of actors and 
organizations involved in assistance to the displaced 
migrants during the six months that followed the episode 
of violence. Restricting the fieldwork to this setting allows a 
full grasp of the local dynamics, assessing the political ten-
sions and differences between the national level and the 
local. In addition, concentrating on the crisis makes it poss-
ible to observe the making and unmaking of victims’ iden-
tities and the first elaboration of modes of (elementary) 
protection for migrants. Clearly, this methodological choice 
implies a focus on a very specific moment, which may 
seem too extraordinary to reflect the everyday exclusion 
and state disinterest migrants face. Yet, the repetition of this 
kind of responses during subsequent episodes of xeno-
phobic violence (in De Doorns in 2009 and in Kwa Zulu 
Natal in 2015) suggests that the case studied here is not 
unique. It constituted a seminal moment when a form of 
(precarious) protection was first elaborated, precisely 
because of the way issues of recognition, justice and forms 
of the welfare state came to be articulated.
In the rest of the article, I examine what it means for the 
state to see xenophobic violence as a disaster, how the dis-
aster opened a space to claim assistance and rights, and 
how the protection set in place failed because of the way 
the disaster was conceived and managed by the state, 
eventually leaving migrants unprotected. The article is 
divided into three sections that follow the temporal 
dynamics of the crisis: the emergency response in the first 
days; the humanitarian assistance to the displaced; and 
finally, the closure of the camps and the reintegration pro-
cess (Igglesden, Polzer, and Monson 2009).
1. “We Would Now Have to See It as a Disaster”: Xenophobia, Disaster and 
the State
The way xenophobic violence came to be seen as a disaster 
by the authorities was not an obvious process, given the 
known unwillingness of the South African state to tackle 
xenophobia and acknowledge its own responsibility in pro-
moting a national polity based on exclusion and inequal-
ities. What constituted the disaster was not any clearer. Was 
it the political crisis, the violence, the underlying social and 
political issues revealed by the crisis, the displacement, or 
the situation of the migrants? The government could have 
declared a state of emergency (though this was politically 
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difficult after apartheid), sent humanitarian assistance 
without necessarily declaring a state of disaster (using 
social relief), or done nothing. Declaring a state of disaster 
addressed the need to order and render legible a complex 
and problematic situation for the state (Scott 1998). Why 
then did the state eventually declare a disaster? What are 
the consequences in terms of framing of the situation?
Violence started in Gauteng on May 11, 2008. The national 
government soon appeared incapable of exercising political 
leadership, while local authorities seemed overwhelmed by 
the situation and were experiencing difficulties controlling 
their territory and restoring order (Boshoff 2008). Even 
before violence broke out in Cape Town on May 22, it was 
already clear that the country was facing a major crisis and 
local actors were expecting the same to happen in their city. 
On May 19, the South African Police Service and the Cape 
Town Metropolitan Police set up a risk management plan, 
establishing an early warning system (a twenty-four-hour call 
line) and emergency plans. The Provincial police commis-
sioner, local and provincial government, civil society as well 
as the Disaster Management Centre established a safety 
forum on May 21 to ensure security and contain the violence.
Ironically, a meeting intended to prevent protests in an 
informal settlement (Du Noon) sparked violence when local 
leaders failed to engage with the population (Cooper 2009). 
In only two days of violence and protests, about 20,000 per-
sons were displaced from the peripheral townships and 
informal settlements (Masiphumelele, Kayelitsha, Imazemo 
Yethu, etc.) throughout the city, taking refuge in community 
halls, churches, and police stations. The population move-
ment was large in comparison with the violence itself (sixty-
five houses and spaza shops were looted or burned, and 
between one and three persons were killed), reflecting the 
widespread fear generated by daily xenophobia (Dodson 
2010). A rapid evacuation initiated by the authorities con-
tributed to rapidly bringing the situation under control 
(Igglesden, Polzer, and Monson 2009). However, the 
expected disaster (the violence) soon revealed what would 
become a disaster in itself: the displacement of migrants. It 
is not self-evident that a large movement of population 
should constitute a crisis. Indeed, large-scale population 
movements following a disaster regularly occur in South 
African cities. During South African winters, floods often 
displace thousands of people from frail dwellings in the 
informal settlements. In early July the same year, about 
39,000 persons were displaced across Cape Town due to tor-
rential rains (Cape Times, 2008). These movements are rou-
tine events that Disaster Management and other emergency 
services are used to dealing with. Even if their responses are 
far from perfect and generally fail to tackle the root causes 
of these disasters (Murray 2009), civil servants know how to 
supply assistance within hours and deal with thousands of 
homeless. Violent protests (such as service delivery protests) 
are also common in Cape Town and routinely dealt with by 
the police (Alexander 2010; Thomas 2010).
In the case of the 2008 xenophobic riots, several aspects 
challenged the authorities’ ability to assess and manage the 
situation. First, the displaced population was scattered 
across ninety shelters set up overnight, rather than gathered 
in a few community centers (see Figure 1). In addition, des-
pite recurrent acts of xenophobic violence (Palmary 2002), 
the authorities had previously not recognized this kind of 
social conflict as a potential disaster, which meant that there 
was no specific plan to deal with the situation.3 It was there-
fore two days before the authorities realized that they would 
actually have to deal with a disaster – meaning that the dis-
aster management centers would become the coordinating 
machinery of an official humanitarian response, as the Head 
of the Provincial Disaster Management Centre explained:
What happened had never happened before, so to predict that 
22,000 people would actually flee their houses, even though 
there isn’t a lot of violence against people, it’s not something that 
could have been predicted. […] Initially, it didn’t seem like there 
were 22,000 people, so once it became clear by Saturday, Sunday 
that the humanitarian displacement was quite significant, the 
Disaster Management Centre would now have to see it as a dis-
aster. (interview, November 2008)
3 One explanation for this lack of planning is that 
political and social disasters were taken out of the 
new legislation in the mid-1990s because of their 
highly political connotation, which led to a focus on 
reducing risks related to the environment at the 
expense of large-scale emergency planning and cen-
tralized emergency control. Another reason was 
clearly a general lack of concern for migrants and 
xenophobia amongst state bureaucrats.
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This quote shows the difficulty of making sense of the situ-
ation during a disaster (Weick 1988): assessing the situ-
ation is both crucial and difficult given the general 
uncertainty and the blurring of boundaries (Dobry 2009). 
As outlined above, producing information about the dis-
placement was made even more complicated because the 
disaster did not fall easily in any of the usual categories. Yet, 
these technical impediments interacted with the political 
question of who was responsible for the migrants and for 
tackling xenophobia.
The realization that there was a disaster was also a response 
to the work of civil society groups that supplied the bulk of 
assistance during the very first days. Because they were 
close to migrants, churches were able to assess the situation 
early on, and were thus amongst the first to provide shelters 
and organize the distribution of food, blankets, and other 
necessities (interview, programme officer, Shade, Septem-
ber 2008). Various NGOs (Sonke, Passop, South Africa 
Human Rights Commission, Black Sash, Cape Town Refu-
gee Centre, COSATU) led by the Treatment Action Cam-
paign (TAC),4 set up a database to dispatch assistance to 
the displaced and information to government, while calling 
for a political solution. This work was critical in shaping 
the terrain of the disaster, as NGOs sought to assert the 
values of South African democracy (Peberdy and Jara 
2011) and to force the state to do “its job”: count, assess, 
provide: 
For three days we almost entirely replaced the role of our inca-
pable state. We built a database of all the refugee sites and 
shared it with City Disaster Management or anyone else willing 
to help. And we organised clothes, warmth and food for thou-
sands of people. (Geffen 2008)
Thanks to their more flexible modes of action and 
extended networks in the communities, civil society groups 
and volunteers were able to produce (more easily than the 
state) information crucial to the provision of first hand 
humanitarian assistance rapidly. In so doing, they greatly 
contributed to framing the events as a humanitarian prob-
lem (Everatt 2011), and the displaced as vulnerable victims, 
contrasted to the “unruly mobs” of the townships (Peberdy 
and Jara, 2011). This vision was itself embedded in the 
social divisions of Cape Town society, torn between the 
White middle-classes residing in the urban center, and the 
African poor relegated to the peripheral townships and 
informal settlements (Hassim et al., 2008). When migrants 
were displaced right at the heart of White middle-class 
suburbs and the city center (see Figure 1), state responses 
were considerably swifter and more significant than when 
violence and displacement occurred in the townships and 
informal settlements (Hassim, Kupe, and Worby 2008).
Figure 1: Map of the 2008 xenophobic violence in Cape Town
4 One of the most prominent South African NGOs 
advocating access to HIV treatment.
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The state’s responses were slow and not all in the same 
direction, revealing conflicts between the different levels of 
the state and political parties. The Office of the Premier of 
the Western Cape soon promoted reintegration at any price 
to assert the ANC’s leadership. The Western Cape is the 
only South African province where the main opposition 
party, the Democratic Alliance, is seriously challenging the 
power of the leading party.5 To prove the ANC’s commit-
ment to the integration of foreigners, fifteen facilitators 
were sent to the communities as early as 23 May (Provin-
cial Government of the Western Cape 2008a and 2008b), 
helped by five hundred anti-crime volunteers and two 
hundred community development workers.6 Yet, this dis-
course remained largely ignorant of both local realities and 
xenophobic discourses at national level, as it tried to force 
reintegration rather than modify the social structures and 
tackle the root causes of the problem.
In the meanwhile, field officers from the City of Cape 
Town Disaster Management Centre were working round 
the clock to assess the extent of the disaster, gather 
information, and provide assistance. They were rapidly 
overwhelmed, given their small number, and had to rely on 
the help of civil society to get a sense of the situation. With-
out clear directions from the authorities, disaster managers 
pursued their routine modes of action: emergency pro-
tection. Therefore, when sheltering people in community 
halls or returning the displaced to the communities proved 
impossible because of local opposition, local authorities 
opened emergency camps to protect the displaced and ease 
the management of the situation by reducing the number 
of sites, as two disaster management officers explained:
But what do you do in a situation like this? You’ve got to make a 
decision. Wrong or right, it doesn’t make a difference; you’ve got 
to make a decision. I said it’s the furthest point from the infor-
mal settlements.7 Plus the people from the informal settlements 
don’t have cars, they may come in taxis, but at least, you can pro-
tect them. Because there’s only one road, and it’s the top road. So 
you could cut both sides off.
This quote reveals the kind of protection deployed during 
the disaster. Indeed, like many of their colleagues, the 
quoted officers were street-level bureaucrats from the 
Cape’s urban middleclass, far from being liberal and fer-
vent supporters of the ANC. One White, one Coloured, 
they both saw African migrants and Black South Africans 
as “Others,” populations different from them; as disaster 
management officers their concern was to apply their pro-
fessional skills to ensure protection of the displaced.8 How-
ever, what this protection meant for them was largely 
restricted to security and technical concerns related to 
their ability to control the situation and assist the popu-
lations.
The City Mayor, for quite different reasons, supported the 
emergency protection hastily set in place. Helen Zille, 
leader of the Democratic Alliance (the main opposition 
party) thought that the camps would allow her to call in 
international humanitarian organizations to manage a situ-
ation that the ANC was not controlling, hoping to embar-
rass an ANC-ruled state (Mail and Guardian 2008). In 
addition, she did not want to further stretch the city’s 
resources or use its community halls that were needed for 
all Capetonians, her electors. Her opposition to the Premier 
of the Western Cape also reflected competing mandates 
between the city, in charge of response to populations 
affected by disasters, and the province, tasked with long-
term social cohesion. Although the province initially liti-
gated to force the city to open its community halls, it finally 
agreed to declare a provincial state of disaster on June 3 and 
to take responsibility for the management of the camps. 
This also enabled the province to take the lead on its politi-
cal rival, clarify leadership and responsibilities, make dis-
aster funding available, and respond to the pressure from 
NGOs. In the end, the declaration of disaster was the result 
5 The Western Cape is the only South African prov-
ince where the majority of the population is not 
Black, but is composed mostly of Whites and Col-
oured. The Democratic Alliance, the leading party in 
this province, finds its support amongst these 
groups.
6 These volunteers are regularly active in the town-
ships (Fourchard 2011).
7 In this case, the local community had threatened to 
set fire to the hall where the migrants were sheltered.
8 The apartheid-era categories of “Black,” “White,” 
and “Coloured” remain significant in questions of 
identity and politics.
There’s a mountain, so they can’t get there. And there’s only one 
road going down, so you could protect the people. That’s why. 
And that is how all these camps all started in our area. (inter-
view, October 2008)
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of social mobilization, a technical emergency management 
led by disaster specialists, and a political fight for power 
and leadership between different layers of the state. 
Despite the declaration of disaster, the situation remained 
chaotic, as there was general reluctance to take responsibil-
ity amongst the various departments. When a state of dis-
aster is declared, leadership normally falls to the 
department responsible for the cause of disaster. In this 
case, as it had not been anticipated, there was no obvious 
candidate, and no-one was showing any will to step up. 
Accepting leadership means bearing the financial costs of 
the disaster, and because the law makes it impossible to 
save unused funds, (Republic of South Africa 2003), dis-
asters always place a strain on current budgets, which 
departments always seek to avoid at all times, regardless of 
the nature of the disaster.9 In addition, nobody wanted to 
own the xenophobia problem. Just like the rest of the 
population whose high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment 
have been regularly surveyed (Crush et al. 2008), civil ser-
vants and policy-makers were also prejudiced against 
foreigners and questioned the legitimacy of their benefit-
ing from state benevolence (Misago et al. 2010). Also, the 
nature of the problem was not self-evident: the displaced 
populations comprised refugees, asylum-seekers, migrants, 
and documented and undocumented foreign nationals, all 
of whom fell under the responsibility of different depart-
ments at national level (Social Development, Home Affairs, 
Police, etc.) and different local and provincial authorities 
(responsible for social integration). Finally, politicians did 
not want to be seen distributing money to foreigners when 
general elections were planned for the following year 
(Pugh 2014). 
In the end, as “nobody else around was here to do it” (inter-
view, head of the Provincial Disaster Management Centre, 
Cape Town, November 2008), and because they are a weak 
body within the South African state, located at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, without power to negotiate their role (Van 
Niekerk 2014), Disaster Management centers continued to 
coordinate the crisis. Despite the appearance of a “depoliti-
cization” of the problem due to this technical framing, it 
was in fact a convenient and political choice that framed 
the disaster in such way that it captured only the vulner-
abilities made visible by population displacement in the 
urban space and limited state responsibilities to minimal 
protection during a fixed period of time. In other words, it 
offered a response that tackled the crisis without engaging 
too much with the issue of xenophobia, which was con-
venient for both bureaucrats and politicians. 
2. On Being “Vulnerable”: Claiming Rights for Migrants, Reaching Out to 
the State
After the declaration of a state of disaster, much of the 
attention focused on the displaced inside the safety sites. In 
the meantime, most people had reintegrated rapidly: by the 
first week of June, only eight thousand displaced migrants 
remained in a small number of shelters and in camps (see 
Figure 2). Government, international organizations, and 
NGOs embarked on a six-month program of assistance. 
The presence of United Nations organizations, most 
notably the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the UN Organization for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was a sign of the focus on 
the camps and the protection of the vulnerable, as the 
former do not normally intervene in South Africa, as one 
of the better-off countries in Southern Africa. Their con-
cern was the level of assistance and protection the state 
should guarantee to these vulnerable populations. The 
question of which category formed the legitimate basis for 
such intervention was again decisive, since each of the 
possible answer would allow different actors to step in: 
being a victim of xenophobic violence, being vulnerable in 
a camp, being displaced, being a migrant, or being a refu-
gee? The question of protection and justice for the “vic-
tims” is tightly linked to the issue of recognition and 
visibility. The organization of assistance and its politics 
reveals how the disaster transformed the displaced 
migrants into vulnerable populations in need of care 
(Revet 2008).
9 Disaster management centers are permanently in 
deficit because of this budget avoidance. On budget-
ary rituals, see Von Holdt (2010).
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What does it mean for disaster managers to take care of 
victims in a camp? As suggested above, the camps were the 
theatre of emergency protection, in other words a technical 
fix. It was first and foremost a practical way of addressing a 
short-term protection need: camps had showers, and were 
far away and easier to manage. The control asserted by the 
state was a consequence of the type of protection deployed 
rather than an initial objective: controlling populations was 
a technical necessity for disaster manager to process 
humanitarian assistance. Still, it had two major con-
sequences. First, it is precisely the organization of the pro-
tection that made it difficult to go beyond first-hand 
assistance and ensure that victims would receive proper 
care. Divided responsibilities between the city and the 
province, political disagreements between them, and the 
unsuitability of normal bureaucratic procedures for emerg-
encies meant that disaster managers had a hard time get-
ting all their requests responded to, and thus delivering 
effective care and protection.
However, far from being only “life technologies” for those 
living “bare lives” (Redfield 2012), the mundane elements 
of the safety sites, the blankets, the baby food, and the 
showers were also the object of intense activism and con-
flict. Humanitarian assistance was not just a bureaucratic 
machine. Camps also constituted a very political site where 
claims of biopolitical citizenship, legal rights, and inclusion 
could be formulated (Robins 2009). In South Africa, “the 
state is recognized as the central biopolitical actor, and 
NGOs and social movements merely seek to nudge this 
juggernaut into taking specific actions such as providing 
policies and resources for anti-retroviral therapy, recogniz-
ing refugee rights, and providing improved sanitation and 
so on” (2). Although these mobilizations resemble those in 
the early 2000s by human rights lawyers for migrants’ 
rights who took government to court to ensure refugees 
and asylum seekers’ access to social relief (Handmaker, la 
Hunt, and Klaaren 2008, 260), TAC extended this right-
based agenda through mobilization on the identification of 
vulnerabilities produced by the violence.
From June onward, TAC turned its actions towards the 
promotion of tolerance and social justice. A new organiz-
ation was launched, the Social Justice Coalition, whose goal 
was to promote social rights and access to equality and 
safety (broadly conceived as protection from threats of 
whatever kind). The safety sites provided an opportunity to 
advocate a broad-based citizenship based on the protection 
from risks, in continuation of its mobilization on AIDS and 
the promotion of a biological citizenship based on access to 
treatment for all (Robins 2008). TAC used a technical man-
agement model borrowed from international organizations 
to develop a political mobilization around the rights of 
individuals. To this end, it relied on the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Internal Displacement to identify international 
norms with which the authorities would be obliged to 
comply. Rather than focusing on the issue of legal status, it 
sought to protect “vulnerable” persons from health risks 
(infectious diseases caused by poor living conditions and 
overcrowding in the camps; remoteness from health facil-
ities), environmental risks (tents were highly vulnerable to 
winter storms and floods), and social exclusion due to the 
isolated locations of the camps (TAC, letter of June 4; 
2008).
Figure 2: Number of displaced persons following the May 2008 
xenophobic violence (source: UN-OCHA and Disaster reports from the 
Provincial Disaster Management Centre)
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To strengthen its position and to address the lack of official 
response, TAC developed its own monitoring methods to 
assess the situation, using universal norms to gain more 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the state (Human and Robins 2012). It 
monitored the camps with rapid assessments undertaken 
by volunteers. For example, by June 5, twenty-eight civil 
society monitors had evaluated no less than 13,041 per-
sons. In early August, TAC and the refugees took the gov-
ernment to court, after a deterioration of health conditions 
in the camps, demanding the adoption of international 
camp management standards from the Sphere Handbook: 
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in 
Humanitarian Response and other UN guidelines. It is par-
ticularly striking that the mobilization adopted the lan-
guage of risk assessment, rather than addressing 
xenophobia. In other words, it used the same tools as the 
state, not just to pressure the latter to act, but to advocate 
for an alternative, enlarged, and all-inclusive type of pro-
tection. These mobilizations led the Provincial Disaster 
Management Centre to adopt Guidelines for Humanitarian 
Situations on 15 August. Yet, this did not really bring any 
solutions to the situation of migrants, as the camps were 
progressively being shut down while remaining popu-
lations were gathered at one site, the Blue Water Camp, at 
the far end of the Cape Flats, separated from the city by an 
empty piece of land and facing the ocean (see Figure 3).
For the displaced in the camps, being labeled vulnerable 
created a tension between their bodies, reified by risk 
assessments and politics beyond them to vulnerable 
objects, and their own strategies, that used multiple identi-
fications (Fassin 2010) and political subjectivities through 
mobilizations (Segatti and Polzer 2012). The displaced 
were a relatively heterogeneous group, consisting of popu-
lations with different statuses (documented and undocu-
mented migrants, refugees, asylum seekers). For many, their 
uncertain (il)legal situation was the main problem, as it 
deprived them of an official existence, and thus of the 
possibility to integrate fully into South African society. 
Many would have preferred resettlement to a third country 
through the intervention of UNHCR, as they wished 
neither to return to their own (Zimbabwe, Somalia, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, etc.) nor to stay in a country that 
did not welcome them. This aspiration created incentives 
to remain in the camps, in the hope that the visibility of 
their vulnerability would lead international organizations 
to intervene: “For them, the rudimentary shelter was not an 
act of desperation and fortitude but a place of opportunism 
and conspiracy” (Desai 2010, 101). This solution was highly 
improbable given that in South Africa the state is the sole 
authority to recognize refugees (unlike many African coun-
tries where UNHCR manages refugees camps), and UN 
organizations consider South Africa a safe country. Yet, 
many of the displaced remaining in the camps were in a 
situation of financial or social fragility. The increased pres-
ence of vulnerable migrants relates to shifts in South Afri-
can migration policy that had recently tightened 
prescreening at the border, meaning that the most destitute 
were most likely to enter the country (Hammerstad 2012; 
Klotz 2012). For lack of a better solution, the remaining 
displaced hoped to live in the camps, apart from the rest of 
the population.
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Figure 3: The Blue Water safety site (author’s photo)
3. “Protecting the Most Vulnerable”: The Limits of Statecraft and Citizenship
A few days before the official closure of the Blue Water 
safety site at the end of November 2008, a strategic planner 
from the reintegration team of the Department of the Pre-
mier visited it. He insisted that the site had to close, and 
that in any case foreigners were not to live separately from 
South Africans, as this was the official line of the provincial 
government. The planner, a long-time comrade (former 
ANC activist), well versed in conflict resolution and secur-
ity issues, felt sorry and upset at the same time. He 
appeared to understand the plight of the displaced, but 
considered that the state had done its job by offering six 
months of social relief, and that from now on, the nearly 
five hundred remaining displaced persons would have to 
reintegrate into communities by themselves, before the 
police evicted them for unlawful use of public space. In a 
last gesture of compassion, he asked the volunteers, who 
were still distributing food on a daily basis, to compile a list 
of the twenty or so “most vulnerable” persons (pregnant 
women, sick and old persons, etc.) whom the government 
would take responsibility for, while the others would be 
required to vacate the site before an official evacuation 
order would be given. The volunteers refused and said they 
would not choose some displaced over others. In the end, 
the government did nothing more, and relied mostly on the 
funds provided by UNHCR to help migrants reintegrate 
and the reintegration work undertaken by various NGOs. 
As the planner explained later: 
Well, that’s the real challenge because we also knew that the sig-
nificantly small percentage of people who were left – a thou-
sand, maybe two thousand of them – were before, during, and 
will remain after this, acutely desperate and in need. And des-
perate in a number of senses, not financially maybe, but lacking 
what you and I may take for granted, which is a social support 
structure. They’re not tied into any broad network of people 
who care for them. And again, it’s not a government job. If you 
look for government to do that, it’s going to fail … you know. Gov-
ernment cannot provide people with social networks. (interview, 
October 2008).
His position was ambiguous, as he assumed that the 
responsibility to integrate fell on individuals while partially 
acknowledging that some migrants were not really in a 
position to integrate. In his view, care and protection 
should come first through the community and the family 
(“social networks”) while the state was not there to provide 
universal and permanent protection; its role was to offer 
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care when no other alternatives were available. In practice, 
it could not be said that the state had done its “job” in pro-
tecting the displaced as, at every level of government, it had 
not worked out the deep issues that had given rise to the 
crisis in the communities (Sinwell 2011). Most promi-
nently, the question of legal status and the difficulty for 
asylum seekers and migrants to get documentation for 
more than a few months had not been addressed. In addi-
tion, he was asking the displaced to return to face the very 
danger that had made them leave their communities in the 
first place, regardless of their status and relations with the 
communities. He neglected the fact that integration is not 
only an individual responsibility but also requires a politi-
cal acknowledgement (through legal status) and cohesive 
communities – none of which existed in the fragmented 
nationalist South Africa. Thus, there could not be any 
promises of safety.
These conceptions were highly consistent with the post-
apartheid justifications of the provision of welfare by the 
state (Seekings 2009; Ally 2009). They revealed more 
broadly why the state appeared to fail to protect the 
migrants, despite providing six months of assistance and 
promoted reintegration (at least in Cape Town). The prob-
lem was not only (or not really) the level of assistance, but 
rather, forms it took, which focused mostly on protecting a 
few of the “most vulnerable” to the detriment of broader 
forms of social integration.10 As Firoz Khan suggested, the 
South African “government’s exclusive social assistance 
focus on the relative neglect of social insurance and/or the 
evacuation of the latter from the policy agenda figure 
prominently in fueling and deepening both poverty and 
inequality” (2013, 575). This point is equally present in the 
political imagination and justification of welfare in disaster 
management. Indeed, the South African disaster manage-
ment law reveals a limited conception of the vulnerable 
populations in need of protection that finds its roots in the 
political values of the elite as well as bureaucratic com-
plexities. Tellingly, when the legislation was being discussed 
in parliament in 2003, a deputy from the ANC stressed that 
the Act “is aimed at enabling our communities to mitigate 
the severity or consequences of disasters” (Republic of 
South Africa 2002). The state did not set out to take the 
lead on protecting individuals, but instead to “enable” com-
munities, social networks, and individuals to do so by 
themselves. This limiting conception of state intervention 
stemmed from a belief in individual responsibility ambigu-
ously rooted in empowerment thinking and neo-liberal 
influence (Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013; Van den Heever 
2011). Financial constraints and the incapacitation of 
bureaucracies resulting from new public management pol-
icies (Chipkin 2011) led to limits on the extent of disaster 
management, so that it would not have to take responsibil-
ity for all the causes of disasters that generally lie in com-
binations of poverty, inequality, social disintegration, poor 
housing, low income, etc. Despite its progressive and devel-
opmental intentions, the state would provide a posteriori 
protection and mitigate the possible outcomes, but would 
not be responsible for transforming the distribution of vul-
nerabilities and risks in society. What is at stake is the reach 
of the state: it prefers to empower local actors to reduce 
their own vulnerabilities rather than require government 
actors to take responsibility for fighting social inequalities. 
The state would nonetheless provide assistance, but only to 
the most vulnerable and deserving – the elderly, the sick, 
and children (Seekings 2009), and in exchange for the 
wielding of control over individuals (Ally 2009). Con-
sequently, responding to xenophobia as a disaster may 
never bring the state to tackle the root causes of the prob-
lem, only its visible surface.
The reintegration plan developed by the Premier’s office 
stated that the objective was “a community that respects 
and protects all its inhabitants” (Provincial Government of 
the Western Cape 2008b), rather than have the state ensure 
protection. State and international organizations con-
sidered reintegration as a problem of (dis)incentives 
(access to state benefits, social disintegration, financial 
10 An observer from OCHA pointed out that the 
level of assistance was much higher in South Africa 
than in many refugee camps elsewhere in Africa 
(interview, December 2008).
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resources etc.): they hoped that financial help would suffice 
to encourage migrants to return to the communities – the 
supposed locus of protection. Still, some migrants refused 
to accept the money distributed by UNHCR, as it would 
not have solved their problem (acceptance and recognition 
within the community), and might even have put them in a 
situation of increased danger by identifying them as recipi-
ents of public benevolence – which is precisely what South 
Africans also desperately seek from their state. As one 
migrant woman said to me, one day after being given these 
choices and not being ready to leave the Blue Water site: 
“they don’t understand, it’s not a matter of money.” What 
she hoped for was political recognition through legal 
identification by the state and recognition of her right to be 
protected from the risk of violence in the communities 
where she was supposed to live. In the end, the only option 
for the remaining migrants was to find a solution on their 
own; in other words, to disappear from the camps and 
become invisible again or resist the order to vacate. After 
six months, when the disaster was officially declared over,11 
four hundred still remained at the Blue Water site, but were 
now treated as illegal occupiers of a public facility. The 
tents were finally destroyed by the police in 2010.
Conclusion
To sum up, being labeled as vulnerable provided displaced 
migrants with a possibility to reach out to the state and 
access its protection. However, it also meant reaching the 
limits of a state protection restricted in space, time, and 
situation. All those who reintegrated once again became 
invisible to state benevolence, while subjected to con-
tinuous violence and xenophobia in communities that 
often rejected attempts at reintegration (Desai 2010). Des-
pite the slowness and reluctance of the state to tackle these 
issues, the disaster situation enabled vulnerable persons 
displaced to access social relief – a benefit otherwise unat-
tainable for migrants. Yet, the kind of protection provided 
by the state (and international organizations) was not only 
limited, but also very ambivalent. It signaled a form of rec-
ognition through the temporary victim status that gave 
access to forms of protection, but restricted it to vulnerabil-
ities made visible by the disaster. Humanitarian assistance 
sought by no means to engage with larger issues of dis-
tribution of inequalities, risks, and vulnerabilities, as well as 
recognition of difference and long-term inclusion of 
foreigners in the communities.
The making of victims as vulnerable displaced persons 
explains how the limited engagement of the state – typi-
cally seen as a failure – paradoxically resulted in creating 
exclusion and necessity to care for at the same time. The 
bureaucratic and political constraints of disaster manage-
ment prevented migrants from fully accessing recognition 
and produced more inequalities, while at the same time 
opening a terrain for contestation. The power of the state 
was thus ambivalent, functioning as a source of both con-
trol and protection. It added to the tension between pro-
tection, defined by the state as assistance to the most 
vulnerable, and the biopolitical citizenship promoted by 
NGOs, using vulnerability as a pillar for substantive care to 
be offered to all individuals, whatever their legal status. 
Thus, the way the disaster was managed prevented the root 
causes of the violence being addressed by focusing on the 
“most vulnerable” rather than on widespread xenophobia 
and violence. 
This mode of response to xenophobic violence was later 
institutionalized and became a routine mode of action. 
After the 2008 crisis, the Western Cape Provincial Disaster 
Management Center recognized a new risk (“social con-
flict”), and developed a Social Conflict Emergency Plan 
and a Social Conflict Emergency Committee responsible 
for this kind of disaster. Although it acknowledged the 
possibility of violent conflict because of xenophobia, it 
restricted it to visible and major violence susceptible to dis-
rupt the urban order, leaving invisible violence and daily 
xenophobia untackled. Therefore, when xenophobic viol-
ence happened again a year later in the rural town of De 
Doorns, the same kind of responses were put in place. Pro-
tests in the community led to the displacement of the 
Zimbabweans who had come to work in the farms; a tent 
was set up on a field sport and served as a temporary 
shelter for more than a year as the situation was equally 
intractable. Since then, xenophobic violence continues to 
happen on a regular basis. Again, during spring 2015, after 
six persons were killed in Durban (News24 2015a), disaster 
management opened temporary shelters and deployed 
humanitarian assistance (News24 2015b). 
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To conclude, focusing on migrants’ rights may be necessary 
but does not prove sufficient to solve the issue of xenopho-
bia in South Africa. Understanding the forms of pro-
tection, rather than just the failures of the state, is 
important to suggest that more protection is not always a 
straightforward and obvious answer. Treating xenophobic 
violence as a disaster brings a response only to a part of the 
problem and creates other problems. It rendered migrants 
visible and in need of care, while relegating them outside 
of the spaces of daily urban life. Looking at what pro-
tecting vulnerable displaced migrants meant brought 
attention to the fact that the way the state protects popu-
lations is both necessary and part of the problem. The per-
spective of vulnerability and visibility, rather than just 
rights, calls for a better articulation of issues recognition 
and forms of social protection, in tackling violence and 
xenophobia. Therefore, the treatment of xenophobic viol-
ence cannot be separated from a broader debate on larger 
forms of inclusion, social membership, and welfare pro-
vided by the state, but also by NGOs. Such a perspective 
calls for further research on the treatment of violence and 
disaster that pays a critical attention to the forms of pro-
tection implied by disaster management, and not only to 
the level of protection.
11 Social relief for disaster is by law restricted to a 
period of six months.
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